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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Quentell Henri Hicks appeals from the district court’s Order of Restitution
requiring Hicks to pay $9,650 to the Crime Victim Compensation Program. Hicks argues
on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider the victim’s
employment history in calculating her lost wages and by not adequately considering his
testimony regarding the source of his victim’s PTSD.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On December 14, 2015, Quentell Henri Hicks entered an Alford 1 plea to a felony
domestic violence charge. (R., pp.72-73.) The state alleged that, on October 7, 2015,
Hicks “did willfully and unlawfully use force and/or violence upon Jan White by hitting
her.” (R., p.75.) Statements that White and her son made to the police supported the
allegation. (See PSI, p.3.) The state made clear at the change of plea hearing that “[t]here
maybe [sic] restitution, but nothing has been solidified.” (R., p.72.)
At the sentencing hearing, the state requested “$407 for restitution” but emphasized
the amount was “to be left open to be filed.” (R., p.92.) The district court sentenced Hicks
to a minimum of five years of incarceration with an additional five years indeterminate and
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.95-96.) The district court “further ordered pursuant to I.C.
§ 19-5302 that the court shall reserve jurisdiction to determine the amount of restitution.”
(R., p.96 (capitalization altered).) The district court advised Hicks that “[t]he amount [of
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North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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restitution] shall be determined from time to time by stipulation or upon notice and
hearing.” (Id.)
The district court held another hearing when Hicks’s “rider” expired in November
2016. (R., pp.99-100.) At the hearing, the prosecutor informed the district court and Hicks
that his “office ha[d] received a restitution request from Ms. White” and that he was
working with her to figure out what could “be paid by the state.” (R., p.99.) The district
court placed Hicks on supervised probation for four years and noted that “[r]estitution
[was] left open.” (Id.)
On November 9, 2017, the state filed a Memorandum Of Restitution seeking $9,650
in restitution to be paid to the Crime Victim’s Compensation Program (CVCP). (R., p.125.)
The state attached a letter from CVCP and a summary itemizing the payments made by
CVCP that indicated $9,650 had been paid out to White for “wage loss.” (R., pp.127-28.)
On December 12, 2017, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the request
for restitution. (R., pp.144-45.) The state presented testimony from Erica Chown, a
financial recovery officer at CVCP. (Tr., p.6, L.17 – p.7, L.7.) She outlined the protocol
that CVCP follows when it receives an application from a victim: CVCP gathers
information from the victim about the crime and requests “law enforcement reports and
other pertinent information” to substantiate the information gathered from the victim and
to determine eligibility for payment. (Tr., p.7, L.23 – p.8, L.13.) If CVCP determines the
victim is eligible to participate in the program, it contacts the victim to gather information
about expenses incurred by the victim as a result of the crime. (Id.) Based on the
information provided by the victim and the benefits CVCP can offer, CVCP then requests
“information from the providers in order to substantiate the claims for services rendered.”
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(Tr., p.8, Ls.10-13.) If the information gathered supports the victim’s request, CVCP “pays
a maximum of $175 or two-thirds of the average weekly wage for the time period that was
established that the victim missed work.” (Tr., p.9, Ls.15-23.)
Chown testified that CVCP followed its protocol in this case. (Tr., p.8, Ls.14-16.)
White requested payment “for time missed from work.” (Tr., p.8, L.23 – p.9, L.1.) CVCP
requested “information directly from her employer, and then . . . also corroborated her
crime-related disability from work with her treating health care provider.” (Tr., p.9, Ls.210.) CVCP “received documentation from a treating health care provider indicating a
formal diagnosis that was related to the crime and disabled Jan White from work for the
indicated period of time.” (Tr., p.13, L.19 – p.14, L.1.) Specifically, Dr. Jeffrey Meech, a
doctor of psychology, diagnosed White with PTSD related to Hicks’s battery of White.
(Tr., p.16, L.19 – p.17, L.6.) CVCP independently verified that Dr. Meech “was licensed
to practice in the state of Idaho and that his license is current and valid.” (Tr., p.17, Ls.1523.)
Based on the information CVCP gathered from White’s employer and health care
provider, CVCP determined White was eligible for a weekly payment of $175 for four
separate periods of time: October 7-14, 2015 ($200); October 16, 2015 ($25); October 20
– November 1, 2015 ($325); and November 3, 2015 – October 31, 2016 ($9,100). (Tr.,
p.9, L.15 – p.11, L.2; State’s Exhibit 1.) CVCP determined the total compensable amount
was $9,650 and paid White that amount. (Tr., p.9, Ls.11-14, State’s Exhibit 1.)
Hicks was the only witness for the defense. He conceded that White had a job on
October 7, 2015—the first day in CVCP’s calculation for lost wages—but testified that she
did not have a job prior to that from October 2013 through October 6, 2015—dates that
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were not used in CVCP’s calculation for lost wages. (Tr., p.23, Ls.1-11.) Hicks testified
that he is willing to pay for the first three periods calculated by CVCP but not the fourth
period because he did not “feel as though it’s fair” because “Ms. White has never had any
employment history,” she “is not willing to work,” and “[s]he wants to live off of other
people’s money.” (Tr., p.23, L.24 – p.25, L.3.) He also testified that “[h]er stress/PTSD,
it’s caused from her divorce that she’s been going through.” (Id.)
Hicks’s counsel argued to the district court that, “[w]hen you have to show lost
wages, you have to show that there was in fact a pattern of employment.” (Tr., p.26, Ls.1214.) The district court pressed Hicks’s counsel to provide “one case . . . that says you have
to have a pattern in order to establish wage loss.” (Tr., p.26, Ls.21-24.) Hicks’s counsel
could not do so. (Tr., p.27, Ls.9-11.)
The district court found that Hicks’s defense “isn’t supported by the law.” (Tr.,
p.27, L.15 – p.28, L.12.) The district court ordered Hicks to pay $9,650 in restitution to
CVCP for payments it had made to White (R., p.146), because “[t]he police report indicates
that the victim was working on the day in question, and Mr. Hicks verifies today that she
was working on that day in question” (Tr., p.28, Ls.5-12). Hicks timely appealed from that
order. (R., pp.148-51.)
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ISSUE
Hicks states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered restitution?
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Hicks failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered
restitution?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Ordered Restitution
A.

Introduction
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Hicks to pay $9,650

to CVCP. Evidence presented at the restitution hearing showed that CVCP verified with
the victim’s employer and medical provider the wages the victim lost as a result of Hicks’s
crime. Because CVCP made payments totaling $9,650 to the victim of Hicks’s crime, the
district court properly ordered Hicks to pay that amount in restitution to CVCP.
Hicks erroneously argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by
failing to consider the victim’s employment history when determining the amount to pay
in restitution. Hicks could not cite to the district court, and has not cited on appeal, any
authority for the proposition that a victim must establish a pattern of employment to obtain
restitution for economic loss suffered as a result of the crime against her. Moreover, the
statute that lists the factors a district court must consider when deciding the amount to order
in restitution makes no mention of the victim’s employment history.
Hicks also argues that the district court did not adequately consider his testimony
as to the source of the victim’s PTSD. But a licensed doctor of psychology determined the
victim’s PTSD was related to Hicks’s crime. The district court did not clearly err by
crediting the doctor’s diagnosis over Hicks’s inconsistent and unsupported say-so.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether to order restitution . . . is within the district court’s discretion . . . .” State

v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 919, 393 P.3d 576, 579 (2017) (alteration omitted). The district
court must “base the restitution award on the preponderance of evidence submitted by the
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prosecutor, defendant, victim, or presentence investigator.”

Id.

“What amount of

restitution to award is a question of fact for the district court, whose findings will not be
disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.” Id.
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Ordered Hicks To Pay
$9,650 In Restitution To CVCP
The district court properly awarded $9,650 in restitution to CVCP. “Unless the

court determines that an order of restitution would be inappropriate or undesirable, it shall
order a defendant found guilty of a crime which results in an economic loss to the victim
to make restitution to the victim.” I.C. § 19-5304(2). Under the statute, “‘[e]conomic loss’
includes, but is not limited to, . . . lost wages.” I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a). And the term “victim”
includes CVCP when “payment was made [by CVCP] to or on behalf of a directly injured
victim.” I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(iii).
The state showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that CVCP paid White
$9,650 for wages she lost due to Hicks’s battery. There was no dispute at the hearing that
White was employed at the time the crime occurred: Hicks himself testified that White had
a job that day. (Tr., p.23, Ls.5-7.) Chown testified that White’s crime-related injury had
been diagnosed as PTSD by a doctor of psychology who was licensed to practice in Idaho.
(Tr., p.16, L.19 – p.17, L.23.) She also testified that CVCP “used the information that was
provided by the health care provider and by the employer to establish a period of disability
during which [White] missed work due to crime-related injuries.” (Tr., p.9, Ls.15-23.)
CVCP came up with “four specific periods of time that were missed and verified by the
employer and the health care providers.” (Tr., p.10, Ls.4-11.) CVCP determined White
was eligible for $175 for each week she missed work. (Tr., p.9, L.11 – p.10, L.11); see
I.C. § 72-1019(1). CVCP calculated and paid out a compensable amount of $9,650. (Tr.,
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p.9, Ls.11-14; State’s Exhibit 1.) Because CVCP paid White $9,650 for wages she lost
due to Hicks’s crime, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Hicks
to pay CVCP $9,650. See I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(iii), (2).
Hicks erroneously argues that the district court abused its discretion by not
considering White’s employment history when deciding the proper amount of restitution.
(Appellant’s brief, p.8.) He could not provide the district court with any authority for the
proposition that a victim must establish a history of employment to receive restitution for
lost wages (Tr., p.26, L.3 – p.27, L.14), and he has failed to provide any such authority on
appeal (Appellant’s brief, p.8). That is reason enough to reject his argument. See Murray
v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) (“‘A party waives an issue cited on
appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking.’” (quoting
State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 94, 967 P.2d 702, 708 (1998))).
But his argument also lacks merit. The Idaho Supreme Court has been clear:
“[w]hether to order restitution, and in what amount, is . . . guided by consideration of the
factors set forth in Idaho Code section 19-5304(7).” Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 919, 393 P.3d
at 579 (quoting State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011)). Idaho
Code § 19-5304(7) makes no mention of the victim’s employment history.
Hicks also argues that the district court did not adequately consider his testimony
that “Ms. White’s stress and PTSD were caused by her divorce and her inability to get
compensation.” (Appellant’s brief, p.8.) Presumably, Hicks is challenging the district
court’s implicit factual finding that he caused White’s PTSD by battering her, which means
he must show clear error. See Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 919, 393 P.3d at 579. He has fallen
far short.
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For starters, Hicks’s argument contradicts his concession at the evidentiary hearing
that it “would be fair and just” for him to pay restitution for the first three periods of time
the victim missed work due to her PTSD. (Tr., p.25, L.19 – p.26, L.2.) If Hicks did not
cause the PTSD, which is the reason White missed work, he should not have to pay any
restitution. Moreover, Hicks provided no basis for his opinion that White’s “stress/PTSD,
it’s caused from her divorce that she’s been going through.” (Tr., p.24, L.8 – p.25, L.3.)
And Hicks’s opinion was contradicted by a doctor of psychology who verified that White’s
PTSD was related to Hicks’s crime. (Tr., p.16, L.19 – p.17, L.6.) The district court did
not clearly err by crediting the diagnosis of a doctor of psychology who is licensed to
practice in Idaho over the unsupported opinion provided by Hicks who “attended Tacoma
Community College for 1 ½ years [but] did not graduate.” (PSI, p.15.)

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s Order of
Restitution.
DATED this 31st day of August, 2018.

/s/ Jeff Nye
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 31st day of August, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by
means of iCourt File and Serve:
BEN P. McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Jeff Nye
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
JN/dd
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